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Notes and Comments
COUNSELING THE COUNSELORS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
OF COUNSELING MINORS WITHOUT
PARENTAL CONSENT
A fifteen-year-old girl walks into the office of a pregnancy counsel-
ing service and informs the social worker on duty that she is pregnant
and wishes to obtain an abortion, but has no money and cannot discuss
the matter with her parents. A sixteen-year-old boy calls a neighbor-
hood "hotline" telephone number and tells the volunteer who answers
the phone that he has a hard drug problem, wants help from someone,
but will not permit his parents to know. An eighteen-year-old girl
arrives at a family counseling center with a suitcase and a firm resolve
never to return home. A thirteen-year-old boy tells a minister in a
resort community that he thinks he is a homosexual and wishes to
conceal this problem from his parents. The natural and professional
instinct of the counselors involved in these situations, all of which do
arise, is to provide help of some sort to the client.' The counselor,
however, may fear legal liability if he should help the child without
his parents' knowledge. 2
1. Questionnaires were sent to thirty agencies which were thought to have an
interest in the subject matter of this discussion. Twelve responses were received.
While this is not a sufficient number to support conclusions on a statistical basis, the
responses received covered a wide range of types of agencies and included several of
the more important agencies involved in youth counseling in Maryland; therefore it
seems likely that some measure of the feeling of counselors has been obtained. The
agencies which responded included, among others, the Associated Catholic Charities,
the Jewish Family and Children's Service, the Man Alive program (drug addiction),
Planned Parenthood, Inc., Lutheran Social Services, Northwest Drug Alert, the Young
Women's Christian Association, and several major college counseling centers. Ques-
tion 1 was "Do you counsel minors without the consent of their parents?" Ten
answered "yes" ; one answered "one time only"; and one answered "no." This indicates
that such counseling is being conducted. The questionnaires and all correspondence
cited infra are on file in the Maryland Law Review offices.
2. The question of liability might easily arise, although none of those who re-
sponded to the questionnaire answered that they had ever been subjected to harassment
by law enforcement officials. Eight claimed that they fear possible sanctions because
they deal with youthful drug users, and seven stated that they desire further legal
protection.
An equally serious problem is the threat of community pressure on counseling
agencies. For example, the Harundale Youth Center, a counseling and recreation
facility for teenagers located in a shopping center south of Baltimore, was almost
forced to close in 1970, when an official of a neighborhood improvement association
sought to link the Center with the abduction and murder of a local girl. Police found
no connection between the Center and the incident, but the County Executive later
refused to approve the Center's request for federal funds. A year-long campaign by
the Center's staff and board of directors was necessary to overcome the unfavorable
publicity and restore the facility's financial position. Evening Sun (Baltimore), Jan.
31, 1972, § C, at 4, cols. 1-6. The impact of such negative public reaction to an agency's
practices is beyond the scope of this discussion.
COUNSELING THE COUNSELORS
The problem of how the law would act upon the relationship
between counselor and minor is not settled, nor is it clear how the law
would be brought into the situation. The legal and moral ambiguities'
raise questions of vital importance to agencies, parents and minors.
Scope of Discussion
This discussion will center around "counseling," "counseling
relationships," and "counseling services," defined to include all services
provided to minors by social agencies,4 and clearly broad enough to
include help to the children in the four hypotheticals posed above.
The central elements of these services are counseling in the traditional
casework framework understood to include proposing solutions to
problems experienced by those seeking help, and the entire range of
psychotherapeutic activities carried on to remedy emotional difficulties
and mental disorders. However, the phrase "counseling services" is
intended to include an even broader range of services; for instance, it
includes the actual treatment of venereal disease as well as advice about
available services and educational programs directed toward avoiding
the disease. Prescription of birth control devices and information as
to where they may be obtained are included. Methadone treatment
and job placement programs are embraced bythe term "counseling"
as applied to the case of drug abuse.
The discussion will concern individuals between the ages of twelve
and twenty-one. While persons outside this age group may also share
many of the same problems, those persons over twelve usually feel
the effects of adolescence, which may create a special need for counsel-
ing; and those under twenty-one experience the problems created by the
legal disabilities imposed upon minors. Children under twelve usually
do not possess sufficient freedom of action to seek counseling help.
For the most part, "without knowledge" and "without consent"
shall be used interchangeably. Counseling without the knowledge of
parents necessarily implies counseling without their consent. There
are probably few situations which involve counseling with parental
3. The fact that many persons agree to counsel young people without parental
consent seems to reflect a decision on their part that such a practice is a valid means
of providing help. However, some feel that family-oriented counseling is a necessity
to the solution of problems. One study found that programs of delinquency prevention
that have focused upon the family have reported contradictory results. See Rodman
& Grams, Juvenile Delinquency and the Family: A Review and Discussion, in TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 188, 207 (President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice ed. 1967). It was
stated that "the effectiveness of parent education in altering attitudes and practices
has not been clearly demonstrated." Id. at 216. One person responding to the
Maryland Law Review's informal questionnaire, Mrs. Shirley Price, Director of
Social Services of the Lutheran Social Services of Maryland, Inc., felt that "one of
the first goals of counseling [a minor seeking counseling without parental consent]
would be planning with him how to involve his parents, who are a significant portion
of his reality."
4. Social workers understand the range of services available as a result of their
work to be extremely broad. See, e.g., A. FINK, C. ANDERSON & M. CONOVER, THE
FIELD OF SOCIAL WORK 6-7 (5th ed. 1968). Social work was defined to be "the art
and science of providing services designed to enhance the interpersonal functioning
of people, both as individuals and in groups." Id. at 1.
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knowledge but without consent, since the parent probably possesses
the power to halt the relationship if he so desires.5 The legal problems
presented by these two situations are sufficiently similar to negate any
need for a definitional distinction between them.
Finally, the terms "agency" and "counselor" are intended to in-
clude those who provide services for children without the knowledge
of their parents. These terms will be limited, however, to persons who
are part of groups which organize to provide counseling help to other
persons. The discussion applies primarily to voluntary agencies rather
than governmental bodies. Some of these agencies have reached a
position of accepted standing, while others are organized relatively
informally and are of comparatively recent origin.' The range of
services, skills and values encompassed by these agencies is broad,
but the attribute of counseling children without parental consent is
an important common factor which justifies their treatment as a group.
THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP OF PARENT AND CHILD
Persons who deal with children must realize that they are not
engaged with people who possess all the rights of adult human beings.
The law does not view children as complete persons equipped with all
the powers which adults possess.7 The activities and conduct of persons
under twenty-one years of age may be restricted to a greater extent
than may the like activities of adults.' These restrictions are ostensibly
5. See notes 16-50 infra and accompanying text.
6. Examples of more "respectable" agencies are Associated Catholic Charities,
Jewish Family and Children's Service, the YWCA, and Planned Parenthood, Inc.
This does not imply that these organizations are staid, ineffective or inactive. These
agencies have operated over a number of years, and have offered services which have
come to be used and accepted by large numbers of people. Agencies such as North-
west Hotline (telephone counseling service) and the People's Free Medical Clinic
(counseling and medical services center) are more recent in origin; they have sprung
up in response to the needs of youth in recent years. While agencies with relatively
informal structures are included in this discussion, the scope is not so broad as to
include every person who helps or counsels a child at one time or another. A doctor
or a teacher, or even a friend might conceivably provide services which are within
the definitions. Thus a doctor may recommend or prescribe contraceptives to a girl
under twenty-one in the course of treatment or may treat a venereal disease problem.
A teacher will often help or counsel children who come to him with problems unre-
lated to classroom matters. However, since agencies are engaged in counseling chil-
dren as their primary occupation, they appear to have the greatest stake in the
subject matter of this discussion, and would feel the effect of the law to the greatest
extent. Thus "agency" means a group which is organized for the purpose of pro-
viding counseling services to others.
7. Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798 (W.D.S.C. 1961).
8. Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 688 (1964) (minors
unsuccessfully challenged constitutionality of a curfew ordinance). Twenty-one is not
necessarily the age at which the State imposes restrictions. For instance, in Maryland
no one under twenty-one may purchase or possess alcoholic beverages. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 2B, § 3(a) (1968). The minimum age at which one may purchase deadly
weapons is eighteen. Id. art. 27, § 406 (1971). Persons under eighteen years of age
may not operate motor vehicles, except if they are sixteen and have passed a course
in driver's education. Id. art. 662, §§ 6-102.2, 6-102.4 (1970). Persons under fifteen
years of age may not buy tobacco. Id. art. 27, § 404 (1971). Thus for different
purposes the age of minority may vary. However, all those under twenty-one may
be restricted. A bill has been introduced in the Maryland House of Delegates to
reduce the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen. H.B. 110, Md. Gen.
Assembly (1972).
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imposed for the protection of infants,9 who lack mature judgment.' °
There is a wide range of restrictions which may be and have been
imposed; for example, states may conclude that minors may not watch
certain movies," stay on the streets past a certain hour,1 2 or be subject
to the same procedural rules as adult parties to legal actions.' 3 The
extent to which infants share the constitutional rights of adults is not
clear.' 4 In short, the law operates upon the theory that "[m]inority
• . . is in itself a recognized badge of incompetency of an infant to
handle his own affairs."' 5
Parents' Power
To secure the protection of minors, the State usually reposes care,
custody and control of a child in his parents.'" American courts view
with great favor the rights of a parent with respect to his child, which
they term the "natural rights" of the parent.' 7 The relationship of
parent and child grows out of natural law, and is not created by the
law ;'- it is against public policy to destroy or limit the relationship.' 9
It is evident that this principle is an attempt to give legal weight to
the effect of biology and the natural tie between the parent and his
child. Because of his natural rights, the parent has the right to direct
the upbringing of his child, and the State generally may not interfere
with parental discretion." Although the State possesses supreme
9. See Ballard v. Buist, 8 Utah 2d 308, 333 P2d 1071 (1959).
10. Ex parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963).
11. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 249 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Tex. 1965).
12. Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 688 (1964).
13. McKay v. Avison, 82 N.J. Super. 92, 196 A.2d 691 (1964) (inability to waive
necessity for service of process upon oneself).
14. The Supreme Court has held that the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment are not for adults only. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court also
recently held that students in public schools enjoy the right to free speech as against
state action in the form of unreasonable regulations by school authorities. Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Constitu-
tional rights may be limited where children are concerned, however. Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (right to sell girlie magazines to children). Ginsberg,
however, did not concern the constitutional rights of the child himself.
Despite these indications that minors may possess all the constitutional rights
of adults, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would extend all of the constitu-
tional requirements for trial to juvenile proceedings. The Maryland Court of Appeals
has twice stated that it did not find it clear whether children possessed all of the
constitutional rights of adults. Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate, 236 Md. 548, 204
A.2d 688 (1964) ; Ex parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963). Both of
these statements were made prior to Gault. The long history of judicial approval of
different treatment for minors and adults has probably established the rationality of
classifications based on age, negating the impact of an argument that different treat-
ment constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law.
An important point is that the question of the constitutional rights of minors
is not the only issue in considering their legal status, since states may regulate their
activities in ways that restrict their independence or mobility without appearing to
infringe on constitutional rights. See, e.g., the restrictions placed on minors cited in
note 8 supra.
15. Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798, 803 (W.D.S.C. 1961).
16. See Ex parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963).
17. Anguis v. Superior Court, 6 Ariz. App. 68, 429 P.2d 702 (1967).
18. In re Zerick, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 525, 129 N.E.2d 661 (Juv. Ct. 1955).
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Lotz v. Lotz, 188 Pa. Super. 241, 146 A.2d 362 (1958).
20. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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power over the welfare of children,"' it may not abrogate the right
of the parent to custody except where such action is required by the
interest of society."2 The result of this judicial philosophy is that
courts usually refuse to interfere with parental rights except in the
most extreme situations. In several cases, a high degree of parental
misconduct has been overlooked because of the parent's right to have
custody and control of his child." In at least one court's eyes, parental
misconduct must be either abandonment or moral depravity amounting
to abandonment before a parent will be found unfit.24
Each party to the parent-child relationship is possessed of rights
and duties as a result of his position. Because many parents are
sensitive to intrusions upon their interests, the law has long been
reluctant to impose a great number of restrictions in this area.25 There
is, therefore, little positive law as to what the obligations are; one
writer states that "[p]arental power probably cannot be defined except
as a residue of all power not lodged elsewhere by the law.""6 It is said
that the parent has the right to custody, care and control of his child,
as well as the child's services and earnings.' The child is generally
held to have a right to shelter, food, clothing, education, support,
guidance and protection. 28
The practical extent of a minor's rights is doubtful, however,
largely because he is without means to enforce or protect them. The
primary ingredient in this lack of effective remedy is the parent's
immunity against suit by the child. 9 While there is no immunity
against suit for willful torts,"0 a parent is not liable for excessive
21. State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901).
22. In re Adoption of Children, 96 N.J. Super. 415, 233 A.2d 188 (1967) ; In re
Zerick, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 525, 129 N.E.2d 661 (Juv. Ct. 1955).
23. See, e.g., In re Rinker, 180 Pa. Super. 20, 117 A.2d 780 (1955) (mother
whose husband deserted her was unable to care for children for long periods because
in hospital; after release mother was often drunk; mother dated married men who
mistreated her and whom children detested; mother not always able to care for
children and keep them in school) ; Sutter v. Yutz, 223 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949) (mother unable to manage finances; subject to great emotional distress due to
bad love affairs and attacks of shingles; tied children to bed, lost them, left them in
filthy condition).
24. Statutory Note, 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 177 (1968) (account of the construction
placed by the Oregon Supreme Court upon ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.523 (2) (a) (1969),
which concerns termination of parental rights, by liberal use of the word "unfit," in
such cases as State v. Grady, 231 Ore. 65, 371 P.2d 68 (1962)).
25. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MIcH. L. REV. 177,
187 (1916). Dean Pound attributed this sensitivity to the fact that the rules, or lack
of them, in this area have been long established, many of the rules being from Roman
law or having their origins in such nonlegal milieux as religion and mores, and to the
problems of practical judicial administration. See notes 29-36 infra and accompany-
ing text.
26. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and The
State, Part 11, 4 FAMILY L.Q. 409, 413 (1970).
27. Draus v. International Silver Co., 105 Conn. 145, 135 A. 437 (1926) ; Rhodes
v. State, 76 Ga. App. 667, 47 S.E.2d 293 (1948).
28. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
29. The much criticized immunity, originated in Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss
703, 9 So. 885 (1891), has been riddled with exceptions. See generally Hinkle, Intra-
family Litigation - Parent and Child, 1968 INs. L.J. 133; Kleinfeld, supra note 26,
at 426.
30. Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (1959).
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punishment unless it was maliciously administered,3' and it has been
said that there is ordinarily no liability for failure to perform parental
duties."2 Parents are afforded wide discretion in the performance of
their duties of support and discipline, and are held to no higher standard
of care than their own abilities permit.33 The justification advanced
for this doctrine rests upon society's interest in maintaining the family
unit in its entirety, which requires the child's obedience.34
Another reason that the child is practically unable to enforce his
rights is that he lacks legal sophistication. Most children do not know
what legal remedies they may possess, and would not be able to gain
access to the courts even if they were afforded a wider range of
remedial power.3 5 Once in court, the child would be faced with the
heavy favor with which courts view parental rights.36
The child's welfare is thus left largely to the inclinations of the
individual parent. There are conditions under which a child may be
removed from his home, such as actual physical mistreatment ;"7 this,
however, provides no sanction against the many possible abuses which
fall short of actual battering. A child may also be placed on his own
through emancipation ;38 however, there are legal obstacles which may
prevent effective use of this doctrine,39 and ignorance of one's right
31. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
32. Id. The case held that there must be such acts as show a complete abandon-
ment of the parental relationship.
33. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942). Thus plaintiff could
not recover for the parent's negligence.
34. Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
35. See Kleinfeld, supra note 26, at 430.
36. See notes 16-24 supra and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (1971) (Maryland's child abuse
statute providing for a report to be made by one who discovers injuries resulting from
abuse, for investigation and proceedings by the State's Attorney, for possible removal
of the child from parental custody, and for criminal penalties for parents who abuse
children). See Belgrad, The Problem of the Battered Child, 2 MD. L. FORUM 37
(1972).
38. Emancipation means the freeing of a child from the care, custody, and con-
trol of his parents. Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958). It
relieves the obligations and extinguishes the immunities between parents and child.
Vaupel v. Bellach, 261 Iowa 376, 154 N.W.2d 149 (1967). Emancipation may be
accomplished by express consent of the parties, or may be inferred from a parent's
acquiescence in the severance of the relationship. Carricato v. Carricato, 384 S.W.2d
85 (Ky. 1964).
39. Emancipation, being in derogation of the parent-child relationship, is not
lightly to be assumed, and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Carricato
v. Carricato, 384 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964) ; Inhabitants of Town of Camden v. Inhabi-
tants of Town of Warren, 160 Me. 158, 200 A.2d 419 (1964). Furthermore, many
cases contain statements to the effect that emancipation depends upon the will of the
parent. See Hall v. Fall, 235 F. Supp. 631 (W.D.N.C. 1964) ; Carricato v. Carricato,
384 S.W.2d 85 (Ky. 1964); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
One doctrine which might be of aid to agencies and children in resisting
parental control is that of emancipation of the child through wrongful or harmful
conduct by the parent. This result was reached in Lucas v. Maryland Drydock Co.,
182 Md. 54, 31 A.2d 637 (1943), in which the court held that an adolescent had been
emancipated by his father's brutal treatment. The finding of emancipation may have
been the result of the procedural setting in that case. The father was attempting to
assert a right to his son's wages; the defendant was the son's employer. It is unlikely
that a child could successfully bring an action seeking a judicial declaration of his
own emancipation. An agency might, however, attempt to. use this theory in legal
proceedings against the parent; the favor accorded the parent-child relationship
would weigh against its success.
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to seek such a remedy is also present. The "balance of power" in the
parent-child relationship clearly favors the parent.
It is clear that in the relationship among parents, children and
third parties, the balance of power rests with the parent, and the State
is very reluctant to intrude upon the parents' authority over the child.
Because of this emphasis, agencies and their juvenile clients might
experience great difficulties in encounters with parents, even if there
were no question of legal proceedings involved. The parent, having
control over his child, may use extralegal means to prevent the counsel-
ing relationship, if he discovers its existence. He may deny privileges,
or limit financial help, which could force the child to refrain from taking
advantage of counseling. He might devise restrictions upon the child's
freedom of action, such as curfews or close supervision of movement
and activities, which would also effectively halt the counseling re-
lationship. He might, of course, forbid the child to continue contact
with the counselor, and enforce the order by direct physical action.
While no question of agency liability would be involved, the results
would be harmful for the child in need of help. He would be denied
whatever benefit he was receiving from the counseling relationship,
and might even be subject to parental reprisals for seeking outside help.
The State's Power
The parent's right to control of his child is not unlimited, however.
The State, because of its special concern for the protection of children,"0
has an interest in the child's welfare which may be paramount to the
right of the parent. The power of the State, known as parens patriae,41
springs from its power to protect those subjects who cannot protect
themselves, and from its interest in the proper upbringing of future
citizens.4 The doctrine permits the State to regulate and restrict the
rights and duties of parents when the need is great or the matter is
particularly relevant to the child's future relations with society.4" One
example of an area in which the State's interest may predominate is
that of the parent's duty to educate his child." It has also been held
40. See notes 7-15 supra and accompanying text.
41. Translated as "father of his country." See, e.g., Ex parte Cromwell, 232
Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963).
42. Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385 S.W.2d 644 (1965);
State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901); In re Jennings, 20 Utah 2d 50,
432 P.2d 879 (1967).
43. Chandler v. Whatley, 238 Ala. 206, 189 So. 751 (1939) (state will deprive
parent of custody in cases of gross misconduct or lack of capacity to train child);
State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902) (state may require father to send
child to school).
An attorney who also teaches young children has expressed cynicism about
this "paternalistic tug-of-war between the state and parents for the control of children."
Arons, Compulsory Education: The Plain People Resist, SATURDAY REVIEW, Jan. 15,
1972, at 57, col. 2. Mr. Arons believes "[diebate about state-versus-parent control
unintentionally obscures the increasingly painful observation that neither of these
claimants is really trusted to provide a supportive, humanistic, and self-actualizing
child-rearing atmosphere, and that both may be becoming dysfunctional and alienating."
Id., col. 3.
44. State v. Bailey 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901). However, there are
limitations upon a state's ability to restrict the parent's duty to educate his child.
There must be some compelling interest. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 168 U.S.
338 [VOL. XXXI
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that the State under certain circumstances may remove a child from
his parents' custody in order that he may be provided with necessary
medical care. 45 The power to regulate is in obvious conflict with the
natural rights of the parent.4 6 The factor which is said to determine
whose interest is superior is the welfare of the child. 7 If there is a
sufficiently clear danger to the child's welfare presented by continued
parental control then the parent's right may yield.
The power to abrogate parental rights rests only with the State
as a result of its special position, and does not extend to third parties.4
The State may, however, decide to place control of the child in a third
person 49 either before or after the exercise of such power by the third
party. Thus if an agency provided emergency care to a minor and
the parents later sought damages for the violation of their parental
rights, the protection normally afforded the State might be granted
to the agency if the court found that the agency assumed the control
which the State would have placed in the agency had the State been
brought into the situation. The agency could also invoke the power
of the State through a petition to the juvenile authorities."
In any legal proceeding, however, an agency might be hampered
by a natural bias in favor of parental control which could affect the
finder of fact. For this reason, it is perhaps wisest for agencies to
avoid resort to the courts as a means of solving problems caused by
parental misconduct.
LEGAL PITFALLS FOR AGENCIES
The agency attempting to counsel minors without parental consent
is clearly foreclosed from any affirmative position in the parent-child
relationship; it is also subject to negative sanctions in the form of
510 (1924) (Oregon statute which prohibited parents from sending children to private
schools was held to restrict unreasonably the liberty of parents to direct the education
of their children) ; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute which prohibited
teaching of German held violative of due process since the state couldn't interfere
with parental rights unless the danger was more substantial). See generally Klein-
feld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, Part II,
4 FAMILY L.Q. 409, 415-24 (1970); Part III, 5 FAMILY L.Q. 64, 91-101 (1971).
45. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) (special guardian
appointed to give consent to blood transfusions over objections of parents who were
Jehovah's Witnesses). See also 12 DEPAUL L. REv. 342 (1963).
46. Some cases indicate that the power of the State is supreme over natural
rights. See, e.g., Chandler v. Whatley, 238 Ala. 206, 189 So. 751 (1939). A similar
explanation is that the usual delegation of control to the parents is a trust. However,
an uneasy balance of natural rights of the parent and State control seems to be a
more accurate depiction of the interrelationship of the two in the American legal
system. See Kleinfeld, Part III, supra note 44, at 68.
47. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas v. Gillard, 203 Pa. Super. 95, 198
A.2d 377 (1964). Allegedly the child's welfare is the paramount question in every
proceeding in which a child is involved. In re Zerick, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 525, 129 N.E.2d
611 (Juv. Ct. 1955). While sometimes a child's wishes will be taken into account,
depending upon his maturity, Ex parte Travis, 126 N.Y.S.2d 130 (Sup. Ct. 1953),
usually the determination of a child's best interests is made by the court. See, e.g.,
Bough v. Bough, 263 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
48. A third party has authority to invoke criminal statutes such as those relating
to child abuse. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 35A (1971).
49. As in a case where both parents are unfit. Bough v. Bough, 263 S.W.2d 573
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
50. See notes 77-82 infra and accompanying text.
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specific actions for interference with parental control. In addition to
these actions, specific problems may result from the effect of the child's
disabilities and the position his parent occupies.
Actions Against Agencies
Agencies may be subject to civil liability for counseling activities.
The chief, and perhaps the only real, danger in this context is liability
for child enticement. The tort of child enticement includes enticement,
abduction and harboring.5 While under early common law a father
had a right of action for enticement only if the child were his heir,52
later cases have held that there is a cause of action against every person
who knowingly interrupts the relation between parent and child, or
abducts or harbors the child.53 The action was originally based upon
the loss of the child's services ;54 however, courts generally allow re-
covery for mental suffering, destruction of the household, and the loss
of society of the child which results from the defendant's actions, even
if no services were actually rendered by the child.5 In situations not
involving actual abduction, there must be some persuasion upon the
defendant's part in order to render him liable.56 However, if there
is persuasive action by the defendant, the fact that the child left parental
control willingly is no defense to the action.17 The action has been
brought against a number of different parties in different situations ;58
the defendants are not necessarily feuding parents or evil strangers.
The possibility of liability for child enticement upon the part
of an agency may best be observed by examining hypothetical situa-
tions involving typical agency action. A counselor might be approached
by a girl with a romantic problem - for example, a sixteen-year-old
dating a twenty-two-year-old man whom her parents have forbidden
her to see. After talking over the problem, the counselor might decide
there is no harm in the relationship and encourage the girl to carry
51. Enticement is persuasion away from the parent's control; abduction is physical
seizing without the child's consent; and harboring is shielding the child or providing
him with refuge from his parents.
52. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 140.
53. See, e.g., Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 78 S.E. 222 (1913) ; RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 700 (1938).
54. See, e.g., Washburn v. Abram, 122 Ky. 53, 90 S.W. 997 (1906).
55. See, e.g., Steward v. Gold Medal Shows, 244 Ala. 583, 14 So. 2d 549 (1943);
Soper v. Igo, Walker & Co., 121 Ky. 550, 89 S.W. 538 (1905) (dictum).
56. Soper v. Crutcher, 29 Ky. L. Rptr. 1080, 96 S.W. 907 (1906). But see Mayes
v. Watt, 387 S.W.2d 872 (Ky. 1964) (the fact that the child went at his own request
is not a material fact). It has also been held that merely employing a minor without
his parent's consent is actionable because of the father's absolute right to the child's
society and services. See Travlinsky v. Ringling Bros. Circus Co., 113 Neb. 632, 204
N.W. 388 (1925).
57. Little v. Holmes, 181 N.C. 413, 107 S.E. 577 (1921).
58. See, e.g., Travlinsky v. Ringling Bros. Circus Co., 113 Neb. 632, 204 N.W.
388 (1925) (employer) ; Pickle v. Page, 225 App. Div. 454, 233 N.Y.S. 461 (1929),
aff'd, 252 N.Y. 474, 169 N.E. 650 (1930) (sheriff who deprived child's grandparents,
who had adopted child, of custody at order of natural mother); McEntee v. New
York Foundling Hosp., 21 Misc. 2d 903, 194 N.Y.S.2d 2969 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (child
placement agency and temporary foster parents who prevented natural mother from
seeing or regaining custody of child) ; Bedard v. Notre Dame Hospital, 89 R.I. 195,
151 A.2d 690 (1959) (hospital); Magnuson v. O'Dea, 75 Wash, 574, 135 P. 640
(1913) (teaching nuns).
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it on in disobedience of the parents' wishes. Here there would be
minimal chance of liability. Under the broad Restatement definition of
the tort59 there was interference with parental control over the child
because the agency directed the girl to disobey a command of her
parents. However, most of the cases of enticement have involved
situations in which the child actually left parental custody. Thus the
court could hold the agency liable if it wished under the broad definition,
or it could hold that this was not sufficient interference or that the
action on these facts was too much in the nature of the prohibited
action for alienation of affections. 60
A situation which involves greater interference with parental
control would be presented by a fifteen-year-old boy who was having
a problem with hallucinogenic drugs, experiencing recurrent psycholog-
ical problems. The counselor might decide to send the child to see a
psychiatrist, in defiance of the parents who have refused to allow the
child to seek help. Here there would be a stronger possibility of liability,
since the agency would have taken positive action. The possibility
seems to depend, much as it does in the first example, upon whether
a court wishes to take a broad view of the tort, or to require an actual
interference with custody.
Actual persuasion from custody presents a clearer, though still
not ironclad, case. A child may come to the agency and tell the
counselor that he can't live with his parents who constantly abuse him.
He would probably ask what he should do. If the agency told the
child to move out, and perhaps helped him find a place to stay, the facts
would fit the tort of enticement, particularly if the child was induced
to leave in part by what he felt to be the wise advice of the counselors.
The strongest possibility of liability would arise in a situation
which would fit a harboring theory. A minister in Ocean City could
be approached by a child who had run away from his home in Severna
Park, and who was running out of money, but absolutely refused to
go home or to allow his parents to be informed. The minister might
help the youth to find a job and find him a place to live. A downtown
counseling center or runaway home could be consulted by a child
who had left home, was living with an older friend and needed advice.
The agency might not only help the child, but might also refuse to
help the parents find him when they inquire of his whereabouts, instead
concealing him. Here it would seem that the agency actually shielded
the child from his parents' control and harbored him.
None of these situations are factually improbable and all involve
some degree of possible liability. While it seems somewhat out of
tune with modern attitudes to speak of liability in the counseling
context, in view of the fact that the tort has been applied to a broad
59. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
60. The action of alienation of affections was abolished by the legislature. MD.
ANN. CODE art. 75C, § 2 (1969). One might argue that the prohibition should extend
to child enticement actions which are similar to alienation of affections and thus
within the policy behind the prohibition. However, the Court of Appeals has con-
cluded that this prohibition does not extend to actions for criminal conversation.
DiBlasio v. Koladner, 233 Md. 512, 197 A.2d 245 (1964). The court, then, has seemed
disinclined to extend the statute beyond its terms.
19 71].
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variety of factual situations, and in view of the solicitous concern with
which courts view the parent-child relationship, liability might be found
within such an unlikely situation. The agency would probably contend
that its action was not the cause of the damage to the parent-child
relationship, finding that cause in the long history of troubles in the
family. The court's view of causation might be more shortsighted.
If a court wished to find liability, the materials would be present. A
vigorous argument against the policy of unbridled parental control
might, however, persuade a court to limit the application of the tort
in the counseling context.
Another possible problem which those who counsel children might
encounter is that of criminal responsibility for child enticement. At
common law, child enticement was not a criminal act,6 ' but Maryland
and other states have statutes which provide criminal penalties for those
who entice or persuade children away from their parents or harbor
them.6 2 In Maryland, this statute applies only to children under twelve,
and, therefore, would not be applicable to the majority of children
who would seek counseling, although it is conceivable that children
under twelve might be involved. In situations in which a statute would
apply, the elements of proof are much the same as those required
to establish civil liability."
Those who counsel children without parental consent could also
be liable for alienation of affections. According to some authorities,
there exists a cause of action which may be brought by one whose
child's affections have been alienated ;" however, others state that there
is no such cause of action. " It is said that the right of action for the
alienation of the affections of one's spouse is based upon the right to
conjugal society, exists by virtue, of the marriage relationship, and
is peculiar thereto, and that, therefore, no cause of action exists where
one's child is involved.6" The question is moot in the numerous states,
like Maryland, which have abolished by statute any action for alienation
of affections.67 While the actions taken by an agency might well
estrange a child from his parents, and thus present an otherwise valid
cause of action, there seems to be little likelihood of recovery on
this theory.
Agencies might also be confronted with the possibility of criminal
responsibility for concealment of a crime. An agency would be liable
if it actually counseled a child to commit a crime; in this instance it
would become an accessory before the fact and would be responsible
61. State v. Rice, 76 N.C. 194 (1877).
62. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2 (1971).
63. See, e.g., State v. Huhn, 346 Mo. 695, 142 S.W.2d 1064 (1940) (penalty for
taking child under twelve away from parent with intent to conceal or detain) ; McNelly
v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 344, 152 S.W.2d 771 (1941) (penalty for knowingly enticing
or decoying minor away from parent or person in parent's stead) ; Cummins v. State,
36 Tex. Crim. 398, 37 S.W. 435 (1896) (penalty for knowingly enticing a child
away from parent held inapplicable on mere fact that defendant hired minor with
knowledge that he had a parent living).
64. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 699 (1938).
65. See Pyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 210 N.W. 926 (1926).
66. 210 N.W. at 929.
67. MD. ANN. CODE art. 75C, § 2 (1969).
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as a principal." Thus if the agency counseled the child to have an
illegal abortion, it would be guilty of a misdemeanor. The agency
might also run afoul of criminal restrictions if it were to discover
the commission of a crime by a minor through his disclosures, and
then fail to reveal this fact to the proper authorities. The agency might
be responsible as an accessory after the fact"9 or for misprision of
felony.70 These possibilities are present only where felonies are con-
cerned and do not extend to concealment of misdemeanors. 71 It is
difficult to see how a counselor could be an accessory after the fact
unless he were actually to overstep the bounds of professional re-
sponsibility and become involved in a plot. Responsibility for misprision
of felony would be more likely in a situation wherein the counselor
learns of the felony but does not inform on the child. There seems to
be little danger from misprision of felony in a counseling context,
however, since mere silence or failure to disclose one's knowledge of
a crime does not lead to liability; there must be some affirmative
attempt to conceal the felon.72 Thus, if an agency learned of a violation
of the narcotics laws in the course of counseling a minor who had a
drug problem, it would probably not be criminally liable if it merely
failed to disclose its knowledge of the crime. However, if it concealed
a felon when it knew that law enforcement officials were about to catch
him, then it might be responsible. If an agency actively helped young
murderers to dispose of incriminating evidence then it would clearly
be liable. However, these requirements seem to envision a more active
role than any agency would play.
Liabilities under Juvenile Laws
Agencies might also encounter problems arising from the juvenile
provisions of the Maryland Code. These provisions were recently
overhauled,73 to provide that a child who is habitually disobedient,
68. See, e.g., Hammett v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 635, 209 S.W. 661 (1919) ; MD.
ANN. CODE art. 43, § 139(a) (3) (1971).
69. See Robinson v. State, 5 Md. App. 723, 249 A.2d 504 (1969). An accessory
after the fact is one who, knowing a felony has been committed, relieves, comforts or
assists the felon. Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549 (1955). In order to be
held under this concept, the defendant must intend to enable the felon to escape detec-
tion; mere acts of charity which relieve or comfort the felon but don't hinder appre-
hension do not render one an accessory. Bielich v. State, 189 Ind. 127, 126 N.E. 220
(1920). In effect one must act in concert with the felon.
70. See State v. Michaud, 150 Me. 479, 114 A.2d 352 (1955). Misprision, a
common law crime, consists of criminal neglect to bring the offender to justice after
commission of the crime, without such assistance as will render the defendant an
accessory. State v. Flynn, 100 R.I. 520, 217 A.2d 432 (1966); State v. Wilson, 80
Vt. 249, 67 A. 533 (1907).
The likelihood of a counselor being prosecuted for misprision appears small.
The Chief of the Narcotics Bureau of the Baltimore City State's Attorney's Office
told the Maryland Law Review that such action would be "self-defeating," noting that
his office is more interested in rehabilitating youthful drug users than in arresting
them. Interview with Joseph B. Harlan, Chief of the Narcotics Bureau, Baltimore
State's Attorney's Office, in Baltimore, Maryland, Mar. 30, 1971.
71. See Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549 (1955).
72. Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1966) ; State v. Michaud, 150
Me. 479, 114 A.2d 352 (1955).
73. Ch. 432, [1969] Md. Laws 1080. The purposes of the new subtitle are, among
others, to remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality, to
1971].
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ungovernable or beyond control without the fault of his parents may
be adjudicated to be "in need of supervision."74 If the child is found to
be in need of supervision the court may make such disposition as is
most suited to the welfare of the child.75 Presumably this includes
commitment and confinement, as well as a number of lesser restrictions
upon the child's freedom of action. Parents who discovered the child's
consultation with an agency could seek to have the child confined or
restricted by complaining that he was beyond their control. If a child
refused to go to school and the parents could not force him to do so,
they might ask the court to assume control. There might be cause for
proceedings if the child disobeyed all parental restrictions in the form
of curfews, and deserted the home for long periods of time. The parents
might dislike the friends with whom the child associated, or have
good reason to believe that he consumed drugs. While this ungovern-
ability might not be the fault of the agency, the court might so restrict
the juvenile's freedom of action as to prevent him from seeking any
further help. Confinement would also sever the relationship.
Of equal significance to agencies, persons who are found to have
contributed to the child's ungovernability may be held criminally re-
sponsible. The juvenile court has jurisdiction over persons over
eighteen for willful acts causing a child to be adjudicated neglected,
delinquent or in need of supervision.76 The language of the statute
seems broad enough to include persons who counsel the child and who
may have, in some manner, contributed to the fact that the parent
could not control the child. If a child stayed away from home and
refused to obey what he considered to be unreasonable parental de-
cisions, and was supported by the agency in his decision that the
orders were irrational, the agency might be found to have contributed
to his ungovernability. If a child ran away, and was aided by a
counselor in finding a place to live and in concealing himself from
his parents, the counselor might be held liable if he had deliberately
and knowingly flouted the parents' wishes. No agency has yet been
held under this provision; nor have there been any reported unsuccessful
attempts. However, parents who wish to create trouble for those who
help their children may attempt to claim that the child became un-
governable because of his contact with the agency.
place a child in a wholesome family environment wherever possible, and to separate a
child from his parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public
safety. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70 (Supp. 1971).
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-1(i) (2) (Supp. 1971). This is, of course,
only one of the provisions under which the court may acquire jurisdiction. The child
may be delinquent, dependent, neglected or mentally handicapped. Id. § 70-2. See
generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, §§ 70 to 70-14 (Supp. 1971). Although the pro-
vision which included runaways under the definition of delinquent, ch. 797, § 1, [1945]
Md. Laws 964, was repealed, the Code still provides that a law enforcement officer
may take a child into custody if he has reasonable grounds to believe the child is
a runaway. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-9(4) (Supp. 1971); thus runaways are
probably still subject to the court's jurisdiction. The juvenile statutes apply only to
children under eighteen. Id. § 70-1 (c).
75. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-19 (Supp. 1971).
76. MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-2(a) (7) (Supp. 1971). The court may also
assume jurisdiction over persons who encourage an absence of proper care. Id. § 91
1966). The penalties for violation of either sections are the same: up to $500 in
ne and/or up to two years in jail Id. § 99.
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On the other hand, if the agency believed that a child was threatened
with harm - emotional or physical - because of parental behavior,
the agency could invoke the provisions of the juvenile code to limit or
terminate parental control. 7 An official in the Maryland Department
of Juvenile Services has indicated that juvenile officials prefer to accept
from parents petitions for determination that a child is in need of
supervision 78  or neglected, 9  but they will accept petitions from
agencies.80
An agency would be foolhardy to petition for juvenile court deter-
mination of a child's status without first attempting to intervene
directly with the child's parents.8 ' The agency should also consider
whether the alternative forms of shelter and support available to the
child will constitute an improvement over his present situation. The
agency must realize that the finder of fact is likely to be biased in favor
of parental control8 2 and anyone seeking to terminate such control
will bear a heavy burden of proof.
Consent to Medical Treatment
The control vested in parents by the law resulted in the phenomenon
that at common law children were unable to consent to medical treat-
ment.8" This presents a problem to agencies which treat sex- or drug-
related problems or other problems involving a need for medical treat-
ment. On the medical level, the problem has been mitigated in Maryland
and in some other states by the passage of statutes which permit
77. The juvenile provisions permit "any person having knowledge of the facts"
to file a petition invoking the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. MD. R.P. 901 (b), 903.
Under the Code, a resulting court order may place legal custody of the child in a
party other than his parent [MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-1(s) (Supp. 1971)] leaving
the parents with certain rights and the obligation to support the child [Id. § 70-1 (t)].
The court may place the child in a facility approved by the Department of Juvenile
Services or the Department of Social Services [Id. §§ 70-12(e), 70-19(a)]. Both
agencies have "purchase of care" funds with which they can pay approved agencies
or individuals to shelter minors in need of care outside their parents' homes. Telephone
interview with Edward J. Lang, Assistant Regional Supervisor, Department of Juvenile
Services, Baltimore City, Jan. 18, 1972.
78. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
79. A neglected child is one who requires the aid of the court; and either
(1) Has been abandoned or deserted by his parents .. . or
(2) whose parent ... does not adequately supply him with food, clothing,
shelter, education... or(3) who suffers... serious harm from an improper home environment ....
MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-1(j) (Supp. 1971).
80. Edward Lang indicated that the Department of Juvenile Services prefers
petitions concerning children in need of supervision to be filed by their parents, but he
said that a counseling agency may file such a petition if the parents will not. An intake
officer for the Department of Juvenile Services filed such a petition on one occasion
when the parents were unwilling to seek the assistance of juvenile authorities. Inter-
view with Edward J. Lang, supra note 77.
81. A court would be unlikely to act on a petition supported by nothing more
authoritative than the agency's repetition of the child's statements to a counselor.
Furthermore, despite the stated interest of the General Assembly in avoiding any taint
from an adjudication under the juvenile provisions [MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-21
(Supp. 1971)], the experience can be traumatic for both parents and children and this
procedure should not be used unless all other efforts on behalf of the child have failed.
82. As Mr. Lang put it, "parents are still just about the best thing we have for
raising kids." Interview with Edward J. Lang, supra note 77.
83. See, e.g., Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935).
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consent in certain situations.8 4  Maryland's statute 5 was recently re-
pealed and re-enacted" in a more concise form which provides that a
minor shall have the same capacity as an adult to consent to medical
treatment if he or she is eighteen, a high school graduate, married or
the mother of a child, or if he or she seeks treatment or advice con-
cerning venereal disease, pregnancy or contraception not amounting
to sterilization. The statute also provides that a minor may consent
if "in the judgment of a physician treating a minor, the obtaining
of consent of any other person would adversely affect the life or
health of the minor."88 While this provision seems to be aimed pri-
marily at emergency situations, its terms could well include non-
emergency treatment of drug addiction. The fact that discretion is
granted to the physician eliminates problems from his viewpoint.8 9
While the statute eliminates many of the difficulties involved in treat-
ment of minors by agencies, it would provide no protection to an
agency which desired to provide medical treatment not within the
specified categories to a person under eighteen. Moreover, the statute
offers no protection to an agency which refers a minor for medical
treatment or counsels the minor after medical treatment has been
concluded.
A similar statute has been enacted in the area of mental health
treatment. 90 As written prior to 1971, section 135A of article 43
provided that a minor of eighteen who professed to have a mental or
emotional disorder could consent to its treatment by a physician or
clinic. In 1971 the age limit was lowered to sixteen." This statute
provides protection when a child is being treated for a mental disorder
by an agency doctor; however, medical personnel are the only people
protected. Thus many of the types of treatment and problems with
which counselors are concerned are excluded. One criticism which
might be leveled concerns the fact that the doctor may inform the
parents of consultation if he in the exercise of his sole discretion de-
cides that such action is proper. 2 This might deter some children
from seeking help. However, this provision may be justifiable where
potentially dangerous disorders are involved.
The primary criticism to which these statutes are subject is that
they leave much ground uncovered, and fail to protect many counseling
84. For a synopsis of the legislation up to 1969, see Pilpel & Wechsler, Birth
Control, Teenagers and the Law, 1 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 29, 31-33 (1969),
updated by the same authors as Birth Control, Teen-Agers and the Law: A New
Look, 1971, 3 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 37 (1971).
85. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135 (1971).
86. Ch. 758, [1971] Md. Laws 1630.
87. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135(a) (1)-(4) (Supp. 1971).
88. Id. § 135(a) (5).
89. Another type of discretion is granted to the physician; he is empowered to
inform the parents of treatment without the consent or over the express refusal of
the minor. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135 (Supp. 1971). This provision seems un-
justifiable; if a child is able to consent to medical treatment there is no reason why
his parents should know of this fact. It may lead to retaliation on their part for this
revolt against their control.
90. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135A (1971 & Supp. 1971).
91. Ch. 601, [1971] Md. Laws 1265.
92. MD. ANN. CODE art 43, § 135A(b) (1971).
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functions which agencies offer. Children who come to agencies for
help have many problems which could not conceivably be termed mental
or emotional disorders even under the most liberal interpretations of
those terms. Thus many counselors are left unprotected. It might be
argued that since ordinary counseling services do not constitute medical
treatment, the minor does not need parental consent; one needs no
consent merely to talk to another person. 93 The argument which may
be made for extending the scope of the statutes is that a statute could
offer protection to the agency against parental harassment in the form
of such actions as child enticement.9" The advisability of extending
these statutes may well turn upon whether counselors bear sufficient
similarity to doctors, especially in terms of the State's ability to
regulate their activities.95
Parents' Right to a Child's Records
In some situations communications made by one person to another
are protected against disclosure in a legal proceeding because of the
public interest in fostering such communications. Agencies and their
juvenile clients would like to see communications made by the child
to the agency protected in this fashion. However, most of the com-
munications by the child are not so protected for two reasons. The
first is that the law has declined to include the records of social workers
as to disclosures made by clients within any privilege, despite the feel-
ing of many persons that such records are entitled to protection.96
Some communications might be privileged,97 but these constitute only
a small portion of the possible range of disclosures which are made by
a minor receiving help.
There is also reason to believe that even if more types of dis-
closures were to be protected, a child would still not be able to take
advantage of the privilege because of his legal status. The decision
on whether or not a client will exercise his power to prevent disclosure
of communications he has made rests with the client. However, as
seen above, a child is not a person who is able to exercise full legal
discretion.9" Thus the decision to exercise or not to exercise a privilege
should rest with the person whom the law has designated to exercise
93. The Supreme Court has held that children have first amendment rights. Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). However,
this does not reach the problem of parental control, since the first and fourteenth
amendments only protect persons from restrictions imposed by their governments.
The real problem is that of parental control of the child's actions; forbidding a child
to talk to someone is within this control. See notes 25-39 supra and accompany-
ing text.
94. See notes 51-58 supra and accompanying text.
95. See further discussion of this question infra p. 352.
96. See Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged
Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 609 (1964) ; LoGatto, Privileged Communication
and the Social Worker, 8 CATHOLIC LAWYER 5 (1962).
97. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 13A (1971) (patient may refuse to disclose
or to permit disclosure of any communication, relating to diagnosis or treatment of his
mental or emotional disorder, made to psychologist, psychiatrist, other patients or
family). In general, records of agencies under consideration would not be so privileged.
98. See notes 7-15 supra and accompanying text.
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control over the child - his parent. As a result of this theory, a parent
would be able to obtain agency records dealing with disclosures made
by his child.
Only one case has confronted this problem. Van Allen v. McCleary9
involved the right of a parent to have access to his child's confidential
school records. The Supreme Court of New York, in an appeal from
a decision by the Commissioner of Education, permitted the parents
to examine the records; there being no precedent, it based its decision
on the law of public records. 00 The reasoning employed by the
Commissioner in his decision' was that although the records were
privileged and confidential, such privilege exists merely to protect a
client from disclosure to other persons. Since the juvenile client is
one who can not exercise full legal discretion, that discretion rests with
his parents who must exercise it for him. A parent, being part
of the school-client relationship, may see the records because he is not
one of those outsiders against whom the privilege was created.
The implication of this doctrine when applied to agencies is that
parents should be allowed to see all the records containing com-
munications from their child. Even if agency records were within
a legal privilege, a parent could, through legal action, force the agency
to give him the records. There would probably be many records
which would interest the parent. The agency would consider this
harmful since it would destroy the private relationship between client
and counselor, and allow the person whom the child is perhaps most
anxious to prevent from seeing those records to see them.10 2 It is true
that the courts need not adopt the Commissioner's theory in a similar
situation; however, it seems to be the reasonable result of the law's
view of the parent-child relationship. Only if the law's emphasis were
changed to reflect a child's ability to exercise discretion would the
result be changed.
99. 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961). See also LoGatto,
Privileged Communication and the Social Worker, 8 CATHOLIC LAWYER 5 (1962),
which criticized the result on the basis of the need for protection for social workers.
100. 211 N.Y.S.2d at 513. Since at common law anyone with a sufficient interest
in public records could examine them, and since the parent had an interest in the
records because they had delegated their educational function to the school, the court
decided that they could see the records. Id. That part of the controversy is not on
point in a discussion of private agencies. Baltimore City presently has "no written
policy" on counseling by staff members or on confidentiality of student records,
although "[t]here can be no question but that teachers, counselors and other staff
members are approached with the kinds of problems" discussed here. Letter from
Robert C. Lloyd, Assistant Superintendent of Baltimore City Public Schools for Pupil
Personnel Services, to Maryland Law Review, Apr. 4, 1971. A proposed rule for the
Baltimore schools would make all student records, including confidential ones, available
to the parents. Proposed Policies and Procedures of Baltimore Board of School
Commissioners 751:3 (Nov. 1970). The situation may be complicated by the passage
of a new statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 85A (Supp. 1971), which provides that
when a student seeks counseling for drug abuse from a teacher or other professional
educator, statements the student makes and observations and conclusions derived from
the counseling by the teacher are privileged. Thus ordinary records such as grades
or test results are probably still available for the parent to view, but any communica-
tion made by the child when he seeks help for a drug-related problem is not.
101. In re Thibadeau, N.Y. Dep't of Educ. No. 6849 (1960). The Supreme
Court quoted the Commissioner's language in Van Allen, and stated that it agreed with
the policy behind the decision. 211 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
102. See Fisher, supra note 96, at 618.
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INCREASED PROTECTION FOR AGENCIES
It is evident that in many respects the law may hinder the forma-
tion of counseling relationships in which children are involved without
the knowledge of their parents. An agency, recognizing a child's
need for help, may choose to work with the child and hope that the
parent remains ignorant; it must fear that an irate parent may halt
the relationship or attempt to make use of the legal tools for harass-
ment which have been described. Since there are reasons why counsel-
ing without parental consent may be a useful device for aiding children
with problems, benefits would result if the hindrances posed by the
law were removed.
There is evidence that counseling and related services are helpful
to a child who is experiencing problems whether they are caused by
parents or arise from other sources.' Counseling services offered to
minors by agencies may be more effective if carried on without the
knowledge of parents. The primary factor may be described as the
deterrent effect: a child, for many legitimate reasons, may wish that
his parents not be told that he has sought counseling. A young person
may therefore state that he will accept counseling only if his parents
are not informed. The knowledge that an agency may notify the parents
will deter children from going to the agency at all. A child would
thus lose any benefits which might be provided by the agency's services.
For instance, a female under sixteen who had syphilis would in most
cases refuse to seek treatment and allow the disease to continue
unchecked if she were afraid that her parents would be told that she
had the disease. A young man of seventeen, addicted to heroin, who
wanted help with his problem, might refuse to go to an agency if he
thought that his parents would be called in, since he would probably
find their hysteria or shock at his illegal behavior distasteful. A child
who wanted to talk over problems caused by emotional mistreatment
at his parents' hands would be loath to approach an agency if he
understood that his parents would be told; he might fear further mis-
treatment by his parents if they discovered that he was going outside
the family to seek help. It is difficult to see how a child would be
harmed by being counseled without his parents' knowledge in these
instances; it is certainly better to provide the services than to allow
the problems to go unsolved. 04 This view is endorsed by many
officials involved with juvenile offenders. 1°5
103. One account of the success of counseling in aiding youth in life crises is given
in McLaney, Casework With A Troubled Teen-ager and Drug Abuser, 52 SOCIAL
CASEWORK 553 (1971). See also R. Dupont, Urban Crime and the Rapid Development
of a Large Heroin Addiction Treatment Program, Nov. 16, 1970 (paper presented at
the Third National Conference on Methadone Treatment in New York City) ; Bern-
stein, Alienated Youth, 33 FED. PROBATION 3 (1969).
104. As stated above, many social workers believe that it may be necessary to
involve the parents in the counseling process to clear up the complete problem. See
note 3 supra. if, however, the child refused to accept counseling if the parents were
told, it would be better to give what help could be given rather than to allow the
problem to continue untreated. Furthermore, no parental involvement would be neces-
sary to treat such a problem as venereal disease.
105. One official expressed the view that "counselling agencies are helpful in keep-ing juveniles from becoming involved with the law." Letter from William C. Litsinger,
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Another reason why it may be necessary to counsel children with-
out their parents' knowledge is that the parent may try to stop the
counseling if he knows of the relationship. For instance, a parent who
knew that he had mistreated his child would probably wish that this
mistreatment not be revealed to persons outside the family. A parent
may desire that his child not seek help because he may feel that the
child's need to go outside the family is a reflection upon the state of
the parent-child relationship or a sign that the child feels that the
parent was unable to help him. A parent who discovered that his
daughter was trying to obtain contraceptives might feel that her
obtaining them will lead to immorality"0 6 and may try to prevent it.
In each of these cases the parent may halt the counseling relationship..
and the problem will remain untreated.
The final reason for allowing counseling relationships without
parental knowledge is not unique to the parent-child problem. It
revolves around the enhanced value to counseling relationships created
by freedom from fear of disclosures made in the course of the relation-
ship. Secrecy is needed in many such relationships, regardless of the
age of the subject, to insure effective help.' Disclosures made in
the course of counseling"0 9 are often extremely personal and embarrass-
ing; in order that the subject will have full freedom to speak his mind
it is necessary that he know that his disclosures will be kept secret." °
Since the parent is an outsider to the relationship,11 ' he should no more
be permitted to know of disclosures made therein than should any other
person. The child may in fact be more anxious to hide these disclosures
from the parent than from anyone else, since many of the disclosures
Jr., Chief of Program Planning for the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services to
Maryland Law Review, Aug. 27, 1971. This view was supported by responses to a
Maryland Law Review questionnaire from Judge John E. Raine, Jr., Circuit Court
for Baltimore County, Judge Robert I. H. Hammerman, Supreme Bench of Baltimore
City, and Judge Orman W. Ketcham, Juvenile Court of Washington, D.C. The captain
of the Baltimore County Police Intelligence Division recently expressed support for a
Towson counseling service which he said had reduced the drug abuse problem in the
area. Evening Sun (Baltimore), Dec. 8, 1971, § D, at 36, col. 6.
106. This belief, however, seems to have no foundation in fact. "Suffice it to say,
in this connection, studies have indicated little if any effect from the increasing avail-
ability of contraceptives on the incidence of premarital or extra marital sex relations."
Pilpel & Wechsler, Birth Control, Teenagers and the Law, 1 FAMILY PLANNING
PERSPECTIvEs 29 (1969).
107. The parent has the power to halt the relationship physically. See text supra
p. 338.
108. See Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged
Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 609 (1964).
109. Counseling is included in the psychotherapeutic professions, since a psycho-
therapeutic relationship is defined as one in which a person is seeking help in solution
of problems caused by psychological and/or environmental pressures from another
whose training and status are such as to warrant others in confiding in him for the
purpose of such help. Id. at 617.
110. Id. at 620. The argument was made there to support the creation of a legal
privilege, which would shield the client from disclosure of what was said and of the
fact of consultation. It also seems logical to use it to advocate secrecy. A similar
position was taken by James A. Ryan, Supervisor, Family Unit, Catholic Social
Services of Baltimore, in answer to the Maryland Law Review questionnaire. Mr.
Ryan stated: "A person in trouble needs assurance of confidentiality when he seeks
help, even in the face of a court order to release information revealed in confidence."
111. He is an outsider in the normal understanding of the relationship. The law
may not share this view. See notes 98-102 supra and accompanying text.
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may concern the relationship with the parent and the child's feelings
about the parent. Thus the child as a client should be permitted to
keep the relationship hidden from his parents just as much as from
any other person.
Even if these reasons for affording protection to the agency and to
the counseling relationship carried on without parental knowledge
be granted, it is possible that there is no need for change in the law.
It is apparent that the present state of the law does not deter the
formation of effective counseling relationships." 2 The agencies ques-
tioned, and others, are engaged in this type of work. None has been
subjected to legal harassment. Perhaps children are well versed at
keeping such consultations secret from their parents, or perhaps parents
who find out have no inclination toward legal reprisals.
Further protection is desired by agencies, and there are specific
changes in the law which would accomplish this result. One change
might be a statute which abolished the action of child enticement" 3
in the same way that heartbalm statutes" 4 abolished the actions for
alienation of affections and breach of promise to marry. There seem
to be few legitimate reasons for retaining this tort in modern society."'
The need for statutory change, however, might be minimal, since no
action of this nature has yet been brought against an agency, and it
seems likely that the courts will hold that agency actions are not within
the scope of the tort.
Agencies favor the creation of a social worker-client privilege." 6
Such a privilege would protect communications made by a child to
the agency from disclosure to outsiders in legal proceedings, if the
parent is considered an outsider."'
The primary reason why specific formal changes in the law will
not give complete protection to agencies is found in the law's view
of the parent-child relationship." 8 Results which hinder counselors,
such as the possibility that a child might not be able to avail himself
112. See note 1 supra.
113. See notes 51-60 supra and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 75C, § 2 (1969) (which prohibits the bringing
of the actions for alienation of affections and breach of promise to marry).
115. One reason for retaining the tort might be for use by a parent where his
ex-spouse violates a custody order and lures the child away. This action could, how-
ever, be punished by a contempt order, although the wronged parent would then get
no damages to soothe his outraged feelings. A parent also might wish to use the tort
to sue someone who lured his child away in order to harm the child. See, e.g., The
Sun (Baltimore), Oct. 4, 1971, § C, at 20, col. 1 (girl was lured away by salesmen,
and forced to sell magazine subscriptions). Both of these examples point up the
law's misplaced emphasis in parent-child relations. Although in reality the primary
victim of these wrongs is the child, in the court's outworn concept it is the parent who
suffers the compensable harm through the loss of the companionship and services
of the child. Retention of the tort indicates the law's assumption that the parent's
interest in the child coincides with the child's welfare. Counselors make no such
assumptions.
116. Such a privilege has been advocated by several writers. See Fisher, The
Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged Communications, 10 WAYNE
L. REV. 609 (1964); LoGatto, Privileged Communication and the Social Worker,
8 CATHOLIc LAWYER 5 (1962). Several respondents to the Maryland Law Review
questionnaire made the same suggestion.
117. See notes 98-102 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 7-50 supra and accompanying text.
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of a privilege, occur because the law does not recognize children as
complete persons. Instead of judging a child's ability to govern his
own behavior on an individual basis, the law regards him as incapable
of governing himself because of his minority, and reposes control with
his parents. This emphasis is probably impossible to change without
a change in the basic fabric of our society.
1 19
The problem also results from the fact that an agency has no legal
authority to challenge the parent. The State and its related agencies
may abrogate parental control under certain circumstances. However,
private agencies are not legally recognized as anything other than
third persons who have few rights as against the parent. While
agencies should be encouraged to carry on counseling, if this en-
couragement is undertaken on a legal level the results may not be
completely helpful. To illustrate, the possibility was mentioned 2 °
that a statute similar to the medical and mental health consent statutes
12 1
might be passed to give the agencies protection from parental harass-
ment. The protections contained in those statutes are limited to
medical personnel, persons over whom the State exercises control
because it licenses and regulates them. In the case of a counseling
statute, it would likewise be necessary to include a definition of what
persons are to be included within the terms of the statute; the State
would be reluctant to give blanket protection to some class of persons
over whom it could exercise no control.
1 22
If agencies were to be licensed and regulated by the State, much of
their present utility in terms of counseling young people might be
dissipated. Many of the minors who seek help without their parents'
knowledge seek it from persons who they feel have no taint of official
authority. A child with a drug problem or a delinquency problem
probably prefers to go to an agency which is strictly private and has no
connection with the government; he may either fear punishment or he
may distrust anyone whom he feels has a connection with "authority."
Therefore, were agencies to be regulated it might deter young persons
from approaching them because of the agencies' official position. The
move toward this position might well be the move which destroys
their utility.
Thus it seems best to encourage such counseling on an informal
level only. The knowledge by children and parents that such help
119. It is possible to reach the conclusion that such a basic change is desirable,
necessary, or even in the process of occurring. The question is discussed in 1970
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN, THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (advocating,
inter alia, increased rights for children and increased legal supervision of the family)
LooK, Jan. 26, 1971, at 21-86.
120. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
121. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 135, 135A (1971 and Supp. 1971).
122. An initial problem might be found in deciding whom to license. The coun-
selors included in this discussion embrace a wide range of different types of agencies.
They address themselves to many different types of problems, and are often possessed
of diverse training and qualifications. For instance, there is a vast difference between
a trained social worker, a telephone volunteer, a doctor involved in a drug treatment
program, a minister, and an educator who works at a college counseling center. It
might be hard to find a common characteristic which could be used to deny protection
to non-agency personnel. One solution might be a licensing body which granted pro-
tection on an ad hoc basis.
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is available may help to keep parental behavior within the bounds of
propriety.123 Because these agencies are trusted and used by young
people, and because they provide help for persons who have no other
place to turn, the law should discourage harassment of them by parents
and others.
GUIDELINES FOR AGENCIES
The counseling of minors without parental consent is an area in
which law and public policy are in sharp conflict. The result is
uncertainty among those involved in youth counseling, typified by the
following advice given to a counseling agency:
. .. it seems obvious to say that the safest legal position
for an agency to assume would be to decline to interview or to
permit attendance in a group session of any unmarried person
under 21 years of age, except with the consent of the parent or
guardian. In practice, it would seem that few agencies adhere
to such a restricted and rigid policy, and neither would we
recommend such a restricted or rigid policy.12 4
Virtually no agency adheres to such rigid guidelines. Practice and
logic require less stringent limitations.
An agency risks little or nothing if it merely permits minors to
talk to its counselors. The risks become greater as the counselor
begins suggesting alternative courses of conduct to the person under
twenty-one, rather than merely supporting the young person's own
attitudes and plans. The possibility of legal liability is greatest when
the agency undertakes actual, affirmative interference with parental
control, through financial support, provision of substitute housing, or
concealment of the child's whereabouts from a parent.
From the support given to counseling efforts. by juvenile and
police officials, it appears unlikely that agencies or individual counselors
would be prosecuted criminally or charged with violation of juvenile
code provisions for activities on behalf of their underage clients. The
risk of civil action by aggrieved parents is greater. In such cases, the
presentation of facts to the court will probably be as important as the
law in the final determination.
If the agency can be found to have acted on the basis of a sound
professional evaluation of a minor's situation, the court's decision is
likely to endorse the agency's action implicitly or explicitly.'25 That
123. See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and The
State, Part II, 4 FAmILy L.Q. 409, 442 (1970). While Kleinfeld did not deal with
the agency question, his suggestion was that one solution to the overwhelming im-
balance of power in the parent's favor and the lack of formal sanctions against the
parent might be "greater permissiveness toward informal techniques for keeping
parents within proper bounds." Id. Encouraging counseling might be such a technique.
124. Letter of Patrick V. Riley, Director of Regional Services, Family Service
Association of America (FSAA), quoted in letter from Clark W. Blackburn, General
Director, FSAA, to the Maryland Law Review, Dec. 29, 1970, at 2.
125. According to one authority, courts are refusing to impose liability on
physicians providing contraceptive services to minors without parental consent even
in states whose statutes do not permit minors to consent to treatment. Pilpel and
Wechsler note that "[t]he action of the major physicians' organizations in endorsing
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"sound professional evaluation" cannot be tempered in advance by
evaluation of the legal situation, because there are no clear legal prece-
dents on which to rely;12 it must continue to be based on the pro-
fessional skill and experience of the counselor. It seems likely that a
counselor with a graduate degree in social work will be presumed
to have greater skill and experience in dealing with minors' problems
than a telephone hotline volunteer. The time and effort demonstrably
taken in trying to resolve the minor's difficulty prior to a court appear-
ance will also be an important element in the court's decision on
whether to accept the agency's good faith and to adopt its position
in the matter.
As long as judicial reasoning is biased in favor of parental control,
agencies would still be advised to avoid legal confrontations with
parents. When such confrontation is unavoidable, the bias can be
overcome by effective advocates who understand that children are the
real victims of the parent-child-agency triangle.
such practice on grounds of sound medical practice should add impetus to general
acceptance of this emerging rule." Pilpel & Wechsler, Birth Control, Teen-Agers
and the Law: A New Look, 1971, 3 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 37, 45 (1971).
126. As a judge in a controversial custody suit remarked, "[1]egal training and
experience are of little practical help in solving the complex problems of human
relations." Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, 153, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 949 (1966). For an excellent discussion of the shortcomings of courts in
dealing with child custody in a similarly complex area, see Watson, The Children of
Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55 (1969).
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